Reclaiming Human Power through Feenberg’s Democratization of Decision-Making in Technology, Society, Politics, and Economics
Sociology 321: Technology and Society. Dr. Lionel Thaver, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. September 4, 2018.
In The Politics of Knowledge, American sociologist Andrew Feenberg develops a critical theory of technology, which includes components of technological hegemony, technical code, double aspect theory and social relativity of efficiency, to argue for the democratization of society through radical change, both technically and politically. The first chapter, entitled “Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power and Democracy,” presents an ultimatum that has grown even more serious over time, particularly in the world of gun culture in the United States. As he challenges “commonsense” views of technology that isolate democratization solely to politics, Feenberg writes “unless democracy can be extended beyond its traditional bounds into the technically mediated domains of social life, its use-value will continue to decline, participation will wither, and the institutions we identify with a free society will gradually disappear” (1995: 4). So how can we democratize technology in the United States, particularly overtly accessible and deadly weapons? Why should we, when our Second Amendment right allows us to bear arms? This is not just a social, political, cultural and economic issue; it is a humanitarian concern. The Politics of Knowledge was published 23 years ago, four years before the mass shooting at Columbine that marked all future generations of American schoolchildren, including myself, to routinely practice lockdown drills and protocols in the case of an active shooter. His critical theory of technology does not explicitly mention gun violence, nor tangible specifications on what exactly democratization entails, only that democratization of technology is not an issue of legal rights, but instead of initiative and participation. My personal experience of learning to normalize mass shootings as an American student can contextualize the enormous power technology currently wields over the social, cultural, political and economic modalities of being.
Hegemony is “a form of domination so deeply rooted in social life that it seems natural to those it dominates” (Feenberg: 1995: 10). The technical hegemony of gun culture itself, the audacity to carry technology to designed to kill, is proudly epitomized by the National Rifle Association in the United States. The gun lobby’s quintessential line is “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” It is true, guns themselves do not choose to shoot and kill on their own accord; they are inanimate objects. But they were invented and exist for a purpose. Guns exist to shoot bullets at a target. The inherent quality of gun design is the perpetuation of violence, even if that gun will be used if and only if it is needed for self-defense. As written in Andrew Murphie and John Potts’ Culture & Technology as an appeal to social attitude, Barry Jones’ rationale denies full technological determinism: “It’s not the thing itself, but the way it’s used that counts” (2003: 22). Technically, a gun lying on the floor is harmless, but consider Marshall McLuhan’s extension thesis: all technology comes down to an extension of the human experience. Firearms, and all technology, empower people to do things they could not do naturally. A bad man is a bad man, but a bad man with a gun can do something much more lethal than he could with his bare hands. McLuhan states in the same article “technologies radically alter the way we are” (Murphie, Potts: 2003: 23). Firearms quite literally alter the way we are. “The act becomes disengaged from physical contact; violence becomes impersonal” (Murphie, Potts: 2003: 28). Those who shoot can never un-shoot. Those who are shot can never be un-shot.
Both Jones’ and McLuhans’ arguments help to justify Feenberg’s double aspect theory, in which “social meaning and functional rationality are inextricably intertwined dimensions of technology” (1995: 12). The scientific and technical and functional and rational dimensions as well as the social meaning and cultural horizon are all dimensions of technology. History shows these two elements of social meaning and technology produce the technical code together, and Feenberg uses bursting boilers on 19th century steamboats as an example for this. The cultural horizon, or the angry politicians and consumers who demanded safer riverboats informed the technological specification, or pressured ship-owners and legislators into the adopting greater regulations that would become the new normal in steamboat technology. “What a boiler ‘is’ was thus defined through a long process of political struggle culminating finally in uniform codes” (Feenberg: 1995: 14). The technology adapted to social change, and the technical code evolved. Feenberg calls out our “fetishism of efficiency” which reflects the highly undemocratic nature of our current age of technology. Modern capitalism overwhelmingly focuses on productivity and prosperity, usually at the expense of environmentally sound technology and worker’s satisfaction and control. Conservatives often oppose regulations, viewing the benefits of strong output and profits as a reasonable tradeoff for the cost of unsafe production, but Feenberg explains that the elements that become essential to objects are determined by design standards, which are controversial only while they are in flux. This argument is all too relevant in the American gun control debate. Gun safety regulations are tensely debated, usually in the aftermath of well-publicized shootings, and gun control measures are suggested. I cannot be neutral on this argument. In terms of generic technological innovation, Feenberg declares “violating the code in order to lower costs is a crime, not a trade-off” (1995: 15). In terms of technical gun regulation and legislative limits, I say violating the code of reasonable self-defense or constitutional freedoms in order to increase killing efficiency for sport is a crime, not a trade-off. “Regulation defines the cultural framework of the economy; it is not an act in the economy” (1995: 15). Feenberg seems to implicitly name efficiency-driven capitalism as the hegemonic power, I say we also add the brute control of the gun lobby to that hegemony with technocrats and bureaucrats.
The original argument against industrial democracy was theorized by Max Weber as rationalist thought, which he defined as the increasing role of calculation and control in social life. Coined a “nightmare dystopia” of the “iron cage of bureaucracy,” rationalization suggests we are destined only for authoritarian, hierarchical and dangerously bureaucratic control. As explained by Feenberg and Herbert Marcus, Weber’s rationalization confounds the control of labor by management with control of nature by technology. With this rationalist thinking, our “chain of being” suggests contradictions. Is it humans who are controlled by the gun lobby, and the gun lobby controlled by bureaucratic powers, or are bureaucratic powers controlled by the gun lobby and the gun lobby by its money hungry producers and bloodthirsty supporters? Feenberg challenges our capitalist comfort zones; our fetishism of efficiency and production is less progressive than we think. “Machine design is thus socially relative in a way that Weber never recognized, and the ‘technological rationality’ it embodies is not universal but particular to capitalism” (1995: 11). When the influence of technology makes all decisions technically mediated, we are no longer in control. Decades before The Politics of Knowledge, Robert L. Heilbroner criticized the dangerous rise and proliferation of technology in social and economic life, stating “the political control needed to buffer its disruptive consequences was seriously inhibited by the prevailing laissez-faire ideology” (1967: 344). Feenberg considers McLuhan’s description that technology has reduced us to the “sex organs of machines,” who merely operate technology (McLuhan: 1964: 46), instead suggesting with vague optimism, that “we need not go underground or native to preserve threatened values such as freedom and individuality” (Feenberg: 1995: 4). If we want to ever truly change the nature of our technology, we must first change the way we think. We are social, cultural products of our currently hegemonic environment; politically dominated by classical neo-liberalism that does not and cannot support the democratization of technology. Resistance takes on many forms. Feenberg adopts the term subversive rationalization, accepting that technology enables agency and power to make decisions. A technological instrument is finalized, shaped, and ultimately determined by the social and cultural aspects of the people who use it, not by the designer. “What the object is for the groups that ultimately decide its fate determines what it becomes as it is redesigned and improved over time” (Feenberg: 1995: 10). The people have the power to trump technocrats. Democracy can be inherent in our decisions, but can only prosper if it is involved in all aspects of life, including technology.
The way we react to shootings matters. Our horror is authentic, or was at one time. Our public reactions become stale as we grow more un-differential, desensitized to senseless violence that is now becoming routine in our country. I think the NRA is already inauthentic in its concerned “thoughts and prayers,” and it is only a matter of time before our society stops caring at all. Are we internalizing nonviolence as a “false principle of humanity?” The democratic values of the United States will continue to decline, wither in participation and our precious institutions we identify with free society- and the authenticity of our constitutionally-granted rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness- will gradually disappear, unless we make a radical change, not just in technology but in our whole society. Feenberg calls for a modern socialism to replace the image of the old, failed Communist experiment, which may be far too bold for the age of the Trump administration. To democratize technology is not an issue of legal rights, but instead of initiative and participation. Feenberg’s “subversive rationalization” requires technological advances that can be made only in opposition to the dominant hegemony.
References:
Feenberg A. (1995) ‘Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power and Democracy” in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Eds. Feenberb A. & A. Hannay), (Indiana University Press: Bloomington) (pp3–22-Chap1) ISBN0–253–20940–4
Heilbroner, R. (1967). ‘Do machines make history?’ Technology and Culture, 8(3); (pages 335–345)
McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. (New York: McGraw Hill)
Murphie A. & J. Potts (2003) Culture & Technology, (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke) Chapter 2 “Theoretical Frameworks” (pages 11- 38)
